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


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Nato stands firm on missiles decision

only forestall missile modernisation by being determined to go ahead with it if need be.

This position was first stipulated by former Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. To call it unnecessarily into question, as some members of Herr Schmidt's party, the Social Democrats, are now doing, is to harm Nato and to encourage the Russians to mark time in Geneva.

If, instead, Moscow came to terms with Nato's stand and President Reagan's call for the withdrawal of all nuclear missiles from Europe, it could make a contribution toward better understanding between the blocs.

The bull is in Moscow's court. It is up to Mr Andropov to go through the motions after talking in such cordial terms of detente.

The Nato countries, as part of their frank outlook, both internal and external, remain sceptical. The West is deeply disappointed by Soviet behaviour.

That is why mention is made in the communiqué of the oppression of the Afghan people by the Soviet Union and of Moscow's reluctance to accept a political solution that would end their suffering.

The situation in Poland is likewise



Bonn meeting

Making a point, American Secretary of State George Shultz (left) with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn. Mr Shultz was making a European tour for talks on a wide range of issues.

greatly at odds with the Helsinki accords, of which the Soviet Union was a co-signatory.

Even the suspension of martial law in Poland is unlikely to alter the fact that the Polish people are deprived of civil rights.

So the Soviet Union has ample, op-

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Uproar as American emergency plans are revealed

There was an intense reaction at the Nato foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels to a report in a British newspaper that the Americans are thinking of transferring their European command HQ from Stuttgart to London. The report, in *The Guardian*, London, was promptly denied strongly in Washington and Bonn. But later an American forces spokesman confirmed that in a war, some of the command functions would be transferred to Britain.

The intensity of the reaction showed how many sore points the *Guardian's* report raised.

For years widespread mistrust has arisen from claims that the Americans have long realised that continental Europe could not possibly be defended in a war.

The Americans are also said to be planning to limit a nuclear war to Western Europe so as to shield their own cities from a Soviet nuclear strike.

The general implication is that the United States is pulling out gradually with a view to fighting, if need be, until the last European but to saving America's own skin.

The transfer of the US headquarters in Europe would fit neatly into the picture.

The hue and cry it prompted show that the Nato foreign ministers in Brussels have painted too pretty a picture of North Atlantic realities.

Last August, when it was learnt that the Americans wanted to transfer US divisions nearer to the GDR border to demonstrate their forward strategy, Bonn was worried the Soviet Union might feel this was a provocation.

German authorities would feel it was a far too drastic step in the other direction if the Americans were now to quit their European headquarters in Stuttgart.

In today's missile age a few hundred miles one way or the other hardly matter. The optical impression is what counts.

A US withdrawal to Britain could look like the surrender of territory that America cannot hold on to.

If the deterrent is to be fully credible, thought must be devoted in time to an alternative HQ from which military leadership can continue to be provided.

That in itself is neither dramatic nor abnormal. If, however, the reports are based on a confidential Pentagon report it would be further proof of Defence Secretary Weinberger's ineptitude in dealing with his allies.

A few months ago Mr Weinberger wanted to dissuade them from selling pipeline to the Soviet Union by threatening US troop withdrawals.

The foreign ministers in Brussels demonstrated a uniform firmness and readiness to talk. What they said was aimed mainly at the new man in the Kremlin, Yuri Andropov.

Their aim was to convince him that the only way to stop Nato missile modernisation is to meet the West half-way in Geneva.

The foreign ministers feel the missile modernisation threat aspect of the December 1979 Nato missiles-and-talks resolution is still fully effective.

All that worries them is the possible strength of opposition to it by Western public opinion.

This point, the one that annoys them, could encourage the Soviet government to feel that US missile modernisation might be stymied without counter-concessions and solely by means of popular unrest in the West.

It will be less than a year before we know for sure who was right in assessing the pressure and counter-pressure.

Doubts and differences of opinion within Nato were adroitly concealed in the pleasing framework of a detailed Nato communiqué.

The North Atlantic pact is not so united as to enable one to rely implicitly on missile modernisation going ahead if the Geneva missile talks break down.

(Central-Anzeiger Bonn, 11 December 1982)

Handwritten note: 1982 12 11

WORLD AFFAIRS

Outsiders look for signs that Bonn is maintaining stability as the keynote

The circumstances surrounding the change of government in Bonn have caused profound alarm abroad. It is not the fact that the Christian Democrats have returned to power, although that is worrying some people who are concerned about ties with the East.

The event that is causing the most concern is the general election scheduled for 6 March. Many are taking it as a sign of weakness and are wondering if it will leave no one with a clear majority.

It is causing concern because the Federal Republic of Germany has long been regarded as a model of domestic stability.

People have grown used to Bonn being one of the few reliable factors in world affairs.

Other European countries might vacillate but Germany was always reliable, predictable and consistent in its foreign policy.

There are other factors involved: the very fact that Helmut Schmidt was ousted although his government had not been defeated at the polls mystified a lot of people.

Then come the disputes within the SPD; the successes of the Greens and their allied alternative groupings at the polls; and the doings of the peace movement. All are causing concern.

"Will the Federal Republic of Germany now turn into a second Italy?" the writer was recently asked by a South American.

Such doubts take us by surprise. We must, of course, bear in mind that the general public in more distant countries learns little about German domestic affairs.

Even among people interested in political developments in Europe, knowledge is strictly limited. So misinterpretations are virtually inevitable.

The ouster of Helmut Schmidt by a Bundestag majority came as a profound shock. Foreign opinion is at a loss to understand how a Bonn Chancellor held in generally high repute could be replaced overnight, as it were, by a man whose name one first had to learn.

This fact alone created the impression that conditions in the Federal Republic were at sixes and sevens.

If the outgoing Bonn government had lost its majority at the polls people would have been surprised but would at least have understood.

But the idea of a Chancellor being ousted in mid-term by a sitting Bundestag was so unusual as to create alarm.

Three other trends have compounded matters: the disputes within the SPD, the successes of the Greens and alternative political groupings at the polls and the showing of the peace movement.

These trends are taken as a matter of course, to have something to do with the change of government in Bonn.

In other continents the last TV news footage from Germany before the change of government was in many cases the major demonstrations by the peace movement.

The impression conveyed was that the Bonn government faced a powerful, irresistible mass movement.

In better-informed circles the success of the Greens, or ecologists, at the polls

in a number of Länder has given rise to alarm.

In a number of cases people have registered the fact that political stalemate has resulted in some Länder. The idea of a "hung parliament" is promptly applied to Bonn.

The new government's decision to hold a mid-term poll six months after assuming power is taken to be a sign of weakness and people are wondering whether it having might not result in no one with a clear majority, as happened in Hamburg and Hesse.

This is what causes most alarm abroad.

People have grown accustomed to Bonn's stability.

This was all the more important as it seemed to ensure a high degree of political continuity in the European Community.

It has led to correspondingly serious alarm in case both Bonn and Western Europe fall into a state of stalemate and domestic uncertainty.

The specific worries vary from country to country. In the United States, or at least in Washington, the big worry is that Bonn might be unable next year to carry out by the Nato resolution to sta-

tion medium-range US missiles in Germany.

Elsewhere, in the southern hemisphere, people are worried that Bonn, and with it the EEC, might no longer be able to play a responsible role in international economic affairs.

This comes at a time when many countries, mainly because of pressing foreign debts, urgently need help, so it is alarming.

This may all seem, to us, wildly exaggerated. It is due for the most part to scanty information and gross misinterpretation.

But facts do not alone matter in politics. What people believe to be facts and the views they hold are equally important.

That is not to say that the change of government in Bonn should never have occurred. It was, when all is said and done, legitimate and in strict accordance with democratic rules.

Nor is it to say that a general election ought not to be held in March, much though the idea might irritate foreign opinion.

Yet these views, encountered abroad, demonstrate the responsibility we owe to the world at large.

We must not, of course, overestimate

The transatlantic political climate has eased. Relations between Bonn and Washington have relaxed a little.

The dispute over steel exports to the United States has been settled. President Reagan has lifted the sanctions imposed in connection with the Siberian gas pipeline contract.

George Shultz at the State Department is not as obvious a presence as his predecessor, Mr Haig.

Mr Shultz is keen to rely on tried and trusted confidential diplomacy. The impression he conveys may be a little boring but his Quiet American approach could well prove the more effective.

Yet alienation remains. The atmosphere may have improved but views contrast starkly on matters of substance. Secretary of State Shultz's Bonn visit, the first step on an extended European tour, failed to bridge this contrast, which is due mainly to differences in assessment of the Soviet Union's role.

While Bonn advocates an outstretched hand policy toward Moscow, Washington advises scepticism.

While Bonn is immediately prepared to receive positive signals from the East, US monitoring stations convey a less sensitive impression.

America wants to see actions in, say, Poland or Afghanistan. To use Mr Shultz's term, the United States wants to quit the signals business and wait for something more substantial.

This is the background against which recent commercial quarrels in the West must be seen.

America may have given up its resistance to the Soviet gas pipeline under construction between Siberia and Western Europe but that cannot be said to signify US approval.

Washington, US officials say time and again, is still against the scheme.

But under Mr Shultz at the State De-

Shultz's quiet approach might just work

partment a pragmatic view has prevailed.

What Washington now wants is something else. It wants America's allies to adopt a joint economic outlook toward the Soviet Union, an overall concept on trade with the East.

Talks have been held in the US capital with the four European gas pipeline countries (Britain, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) and with Canada, Japan and the European Community.

It has been agreed that a closer look must be taken at the problem within the West, although the project is a vague one, outlined in a non-paper, or unofficial document, and wide open to interpretation.

So, different parties to the talks have gained different impressions, and views vary widely on what and how. The aim of Mr Shultz's visit was to press ahead with the project as the United States saw it.

America would dearly like to reach firm agreement on something specific at the May 1983 Western economic summit in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Others are already balking. France, for instance, fears inroads into the sovereignty of its trading policy.

The Reagan administration needs agreement in place of the gas pipeline sanctions. At the same time Mr Shultz has adopted the East-West ideology of his lord and master.

President Reagan's views on the subject began with the simple question:

the international importance of the Federal Republic, which is a small country in international terms.

Politicians have at times been about the Federal Republic being for trading power. This has done harm than good.

It is nonetheless remarkable much importance in other countries placed on the domestic stability and political reliability of Germany.

The prospect of either being seen as a serious upset, especially in view of its repercussions on Europe.

Viewed in this light, the existing Bonn government capable of even greater importance, and reasons with Hamburg or Hesse are leading.

Political stalemate in Hamburg for six months or so is regarded but not a serious problem.

A corresponding stalemate in Bonn would be a political catastrophe, especially because of the deep uncertainty now tension has mounted in the national economic system.

The Federal Republic must at all times remain capable of action beyond March, if only because of its Council responsibilities (Bonn will be the Council of Ministers in the Year).

One can but hope that voters will appreciate this need and ensure that the Bonn government is given a clear majority at the polls.

If the election fails to produce a result the major parties must accept the responsibility they hold. Any other would then be better than none.

Wolfgang Wey
(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 4 December 1982)

"Why should we invest billions of arms build-up against the Soviet Union when we bolster the Soviet system the same time by means of such lions in trade and credit facilities?"

Europe is naturally keen to see American grain shipments to the Soviet Union included in the overall context. An influential European school thought feels the Soviet Union is reduced more by food shipments than anything else.

It remains to be seen whether Shultz will return from Europe with more than fine words and complete the world today is no longer what it was in the 1950s.

Due to geography and the need to come to terms in peace with its Soviet neighbour, Western Europe has evolved interests of its own.

They are more complex than America's. Within the Atlantic alliance give rise to lasting tension, tensions which we look like having to live with.

Horst Schreitter-Schwarz
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 1982)

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HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl seeks to lose a vote and win an election

Handelsblatt

Chancellor Kohl intends to ask the Bundestag for a confidence vote. He wants to lose it.

He has told the Federal President, Carstens, that he wants to do this on an election on 6 March.

A Constitution does not allow the Chancellor to dissolve parliament himself. Carstens is expected to endorse the proposal for a no confidence vote within 21 days, and the way is open for the election.

The question now is: what can the government do in the interim between dissolution and an election? The government has full scope under the Constitution, but it makes full use of this scope.

A radical question that this government has to answer: should the Bundestag continue to exist and after its dissolution — as Congress it might be to the man-in-

charge of the President, the Chancellor is under obligation to stay in office until a new Bundestag is elected.

Half the people questioned in an Emnid Institute poll are dissatisfied with the Kohl government and 46 per cent gave it their approval.

The institute points out that a similar survey just before the change in Bonn showed that only 26 per cent were satisfied with the Schmidt government and 73 per cent were not.

It says that this time, a major factor in the Kohl government's unpopularity are SPD voters: 85 per cent disapprove of the government despite the short time it has been in office.

Among FDP sympathisers there is a three-quarter majority in favour of the Kohl-Genscher government; 86 per cent of CDU/CSU voters approve.

The institute says much of the approval is in expectation of what might happen.

Disapproval is strongest among the Greens alternatives (92 per cent). Simultaneous Emnid polls, asked about the most "likeable" political party. Here, 40 per cent voted for the CDU/CSU, 34 per cent for the SPD, 3 per cent for the FDP and 8 per cent for the Greens.

Eleven per cent said they found none likeable. Four per cent gave no opinion.

Heinz Violan
(Welt am Sonntag, 5 December 1982)

Ing. And it is here that the programme is not convincing.

Election platforms are no coalition agreements, and the FDP is right in stressing this. It is quite unthinkable that, if there is a new conservative-liberal coalition, after elections, the FDP will be able to prevail on all its campaign statements — especially in legal and environmental policy.

The Liberals are bound to clash with the CDU/CSU on such issues as the reform of the anti-terrorism legislation, protection against data abuse (especially in connection with security agencies), aliens legislation and some aspects of environmental legislation.

They are also likely to clash over parts of labour legislation such as continued pay for employees in cases of illness.

Despite efforts to stress specific issues, the campaign will be straightforward and simple — so simple as to ultimately boil down to a plea to the electorate to give the Liberals another chance to move into parliament.

Martin E. Skold
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 1982)

Chancellor can at any time ask the president to dismiss one of his ministers.

Due to a 1976 amendment of the Constitution, the Bundestag, along with the Chancellor, retains full rights until a new Bundestag assumes its function (Article 39). Since a Bundestag must hold its first meeting no more than 30 days after its election, the present parliament will be in office not only after its dissolution by the president but well beyond the elections scheduled for 6 March 1983.

The amendment was adopted with a two-thirds majority in August 1976. It came about in the wake of a dispute dating back to 1972 when Chancellor Willy Brandt lost a confidence vote and parliament was dissolved.

Then, before the amendment, the Bundestag did not continue its work. This was assumed by a "committee to safeguard the rights of the Bundestag".

The parties were unable to agree on whether or not the immunity of the MPs should be upheld after dissolution.

There was also a heated dispute over the question as to whether parliamentary state secretaries should remain in office.

Hans Jörg Saltor
(Handelsblatt, 8 December 1982)

How the government rates

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Here, the views of the government parties (SPD and FDP) naturally clashed with those of the opposition for campaign reasons.

After all, the parliamentary state secretaries preferred to keep their heavy official cars complete with pennants.

All these open issues were settled by the amendment. What remains unresolved is the question whether the incumbent parliament must exercise restraint until the new Bundestag meets.

Making use of all the scope available to it, the opposition SPD could, for instance, call for constant "current affairs debates" in the Bundestag or demand that pending legislation be dealt with.

In fact, some opposition MPs have already suggested such a course of action, though the top leadership of the opposition seems to be rather reluctant to go along.

Another facet is that the coalition parties could turn every Bundestag session into a campaign platform while the opposition would be unable to have its chancellorship candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, use the parliament as a forum.

For one thing, he is not an MP; for another, even as leader of the opposition in the Berlin parliament he cannot enter into a debate from the Bundestag benches.

The Bundestag Council of Elders is trying to bring about a "moderation agreement" as soon as it becomes definitely known how the Bundestag is to be dissolved.

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Martin E. Skold
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 1982)

FDP question a tricky one for Chancellor

Nordwest-Zeitung

The CDU will centre its election campaign around the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. It has deliberately adopted Konrad Adenauer's view that, under the realities of the Constitution, parliamentary elections have become in fact Chancellor elections.

It is natural that in this sort of campaign, there is no room for a partner, in this case the FDP.

But this does not mean that Kohl wants the Free Democrats out of office. He wants them in. But the question is a tactical one: is it wise to keep saying so publicly?

Most of the indications show that Kohl will remain as Chancellor. But alone or in coalition with the FDP?

If it is to be a coalition, the FDP first needs to win the five per cent of the votes necessary to get into the Bundestag. It is doubtful if, in its present condition, the FDP can pull it off.

This could change if the president does in fact dissolve the Bundestag and send the nation to the polls on 6 March. (There is still a constitutional question outstanding which leaves some doubt about whether this mid-term election can be held.)

In their reports to the Bonn party meeting, Helmut Kohl and the party general secretary, Heiner Geissler, mentioned the FDP only in passing, and more or less indirectly when they spoke of a "middle-of-the-road coalition."

Geissler even said that only the CDU/CSU provided an alternative to a "Red-Green alliance."

This was a pretty clear statement — in any event clearer than what was said before in interviews and public statements.

Kohl is right in more or less ignoring the FDP. There is no reason why he should publicly concern himself with Germany's Liberals.

Even if he secretly hopes that the Free Democrats will get enough votes to get into the Bundestag, there is no way he can help them to do so.

There have been those in the CDU who suggested "lending" the Free Democrats votes to help them return to the Bundestag. But these ideas have meanwhile been dropped. As one CDU man puts it: "We haven't got a single vote to give away."

In any event, the CDU/CSU have not yet won the election. It is possible that there will be a shift in the strength of the Bundestag camps that could create all sorts of problems.

If the Greens move into parliament instead of the FDP and if no party gets an absolute majority, the CDU/CSU would be faced with its greatest challenge ever.

With this possibility in mind, the conservatives are determined to fight for every vote — and they would be serving more than just party interests. A stable government with a solid majority is a must for this country.

Karl Hugo Priy
(Nordwest-Zeitung, 7 December 1982)

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Bonn opts for protectionism, membership talks, as Council of Ministers themes

Three issues will dominate when Bonn takes over the chair of the EEC Council of Ministers, in the New Year. They are:

- The attempt to curb protectionism within the EEC
- Membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal
- The growing differences of opinion with the French government on trade policy.

This has been outlined by Alois Mertes, Minister of State for European Affairs at the Bonn Foreign Office.

The harmony that was the hallmark of the Copenhagen EEC summit will soon end when it comes to carrying out the resolutions made by the Common Market heads of government.

The European Community faces a tough year both at home and in external relations.

Bonn is to take over the EEC chair in January. Will the Germans be able to give the Common Market a greater boost than the Danes were able to do over the past six months?

The answer is urgently awaited in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Chancellor Kohl may have put great importance on European policy in his government policy statement. He may also have rushed to Brussels for an executive meeting of European Christian Democrats as soon as he was elected.

But signs of unrest have accumulated. Christian Democrats at the European Parliament in Strasbourg are surprised that contacts with Bonn have been so sparing.

At the European Commission in Brussels, officials were surprised that Mertes had failed to put in an appearance.

Social Democratic Euro-MP Horst Seefeld complained that responsibilities seemed not to have been allocated in Bonn.

Some of these problems have since been solved. At a Paris conference of European Christian Democrats Helmut Kohl has sought to demonstrate his commitment to European integration at party-political level.

Herr Mertes has paid his opposite numbers in Paris and London brief visits. He is also due to visit the European Commission in Brussels.

He has ploughed through the paperwork and reached the conclusion that European integration is hard work.

The list of topics brought back by the domestic market delegation to the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament is disappearing.

It conveys an impression of everyday life in EEC Europe that is bound to put a damper on enthusiasm of any kind.

Mention is made of failure to make headway on settlement of value-added tax on imports; of slow progress on 20 specific technical guidelines; proposals and of stalling on industrial standardisation.

The agenda also includes further powers for the European Commission, tax allowances for travel within the Community and the issue of uniform European Community passports and driving licences.

A specifically German problem is

border checks on individuals, buses and commercial vehicles.

Consolidation of the domestic market is more urgently needed than ever. US Secretary of State Shultz and other heads of department were due to visit Brussels for talks at the time of writing.

Their visit was expected to show whether there was any likelihood of a further transatlantic clash along the lines of the steel war between America and the Common Market.

Farm produce is the latest problem, with the United States fairly accusing the European Community of protectionism.

The trend toward protectionism within the Common Market, especially in the agricultural sector, is one that has long reduced the EEC to a state of paralysis.

It is, moreover, a crucial aspect of the second major issue that lies ahead: the membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal.

Bonn is extremely anxious, for political reasons, to see Spain and Portugal join the EEC. But their accession will cost money, extra cash that is not in the present Common Market kitty.

The two would-be newcomers to the EEC are largely agricultural countries, and their farm output will weigh heavily

ly on the European Community's agricultural levy system.

The French, Greeks and Italians are anything but keen on this prospect, which is why the French are stalling and would like to see this problem solved before Spain and Portugal join the EEC as full members.

Alois Mertes is reluctant to take sides in the dispute on whether this attitude is in the Common Market's best interest.

France, he says, is keener than other EEC countries on a European identity. In doing so it seeks to reconcile European interests with its own.

Much the same is true of the thorny issue of British net contributions to the Common Market kitty, which Whitehall continues to feel are too high.

All Herr Mertes will say is that the problem is one that threatens to poison the Community.

France and Germany were expected to clash on all these issues at Copenhagen. They didn't.

President Mitterrand made with explaining to Chancellor Kohl the specific French problems that arose from, say, southward enlargement of the EEC.

There is speculation in Paris that France's intransigent Foreign Trade Minister, Michel Jobert, who made life so hard for the Bonn delegation at the Gatt talks in Geneva, may be dropped.

Farm policies crucial for Third World

The writer, Professor Stefan Tangermann, holds the chair of agricultural economics at Göttingen University.

countries are put to even greater disadvantage.

In the long run this cannot be to the benefit of the European Community's relations with the Third World.

The development of a liberal international economic order is bound to suffer as a result.

In particular, the EEC hampers what many developing countries, given growing protectionist trends in the industrialised world, feel might be the answer: more trade among themselves.

By means of exports subsidised to the hilt the European Community is barging into markets the developing countries hoped to work themselves.

Despite the growth in overall Third World, self-assurance individual developing countries still have difficulty in prevailing with their own special economic interests over the powerful industrialised world.

Thailand yielding to the EEC on tobacco was a case in point. Industrialised countries can exert much more powerful pressure, as the EEC has found out to its cost in ties with the United States.

In farm trade policy the European Community used to be pampered by the USA. The 1962 chicken war was very much an exception to the rule.

There are various reasons why this has been the case. US agricultural poli-

cy is naturally not free of protectionist tendencies.

The waiver by which the United States retained privileges under the treaty is but one instance of this context.

The crucial factor in ties with the EEC, however, seems to have been the United States did not want to open European integration by industrial economic pressure.

European integration was clearly the US foreign policy interest. EEC farm tariff barriers were initially aimed at imports from the United States in particular.

Initially the Common Market was significant as a competitor in export farm produce to world markets.

Politically, America and Europe drifted further apart than at any time since the Second World War. Economically the United States is against it, especially US agriculture.

It is breathtaking at times to see nonchalantly EEC agricultural exporters play with fire.

They think aloud about hampering the import or consumption of substitutes and soya products from the United States.

Yet at the same time they support farm exports to non-EEC countries heavily that US exporters are pressed by the competition.

Do EEC policymakers realise seriously the United States means time when it objects? Is the EEC Community really prepared for full-scale trade war?

Neither side must allow matters to come to a head. Agricultural trade is so important though it may seem, that it is not so crucial for the world's food supply.

Continued on page 8

UNEMPLOYMENT

Two fundamentally opposing schools of thought

employment is likely to be over 1.5 million when the figures are released on March 3 next year, just before the general election.

The same time, the Bonn government will probably realise that this figure is the average annual figure in other words, 150,000 more official government projection.

They would coincide with the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers that assumed an unemployment of 2.35 per cent.

So although the details are not known, the Bonn government's figure was quite possible. In fact, the Bonn Economic Affairs Commission has for some time been more pessimistic than the rest of the country.

development is likely to add a new dimension to the discussion on ways of fighting unemployment.

Now it seems as if nothing more can be done. All avenues have been explored and job policies have gone as far as they can in Bonn's tight financial

Office this year has spent a lot of money on unemployment. This should rise to about 1.5 million by the end of the year. But the Labour Office's forecasts are based on the assumption that the unemployment rate will be 2.35 per cent.

Even the politically fairly left-wing Berlin economist Hans-Jürgen Krupp doubts that shorter working times would provide much relief on the job market. According to pessimistic estimates, the relief would amount to only 20 per cent of the theoretically possible.

Third, the beneficial effects of shorter working hours would be the smaller the more difficult it proves to find suitable people among the jobless to fill the vacancies.

Though more and more skilled workers become available as unemployment grows, the duration of unemployment is also growing, and this means that workers fall behind on the skills they once possessed.

As a result, further training and retraining programmes for the jobless should be intensified. But this would cost the state and the taxpayer more. In fact, cash has forced the state to cut back on existing programmes.

The objections to early retirement apply even more to shorter work weeks.

Part-time work might be better. According to Mannheim economist Eduard Czapig, some 60 per cent of today's full-time jobs could be split.

But whether or not this will happen will depend on the cost of splitting jobs and the willingness of the employee to give up some of his work and pay. Those who have to look after a family are not very likely to agree to it.

The same applies to job sharing where one particular job is shared by two or more people.

Granted, a television cameraman whose wife also works a TV camera might decide to share the job with her. A couple, both of whom are pastors, might also decide to take turns looking after their flock. So might couples both of whom are doctors. Mother and daughter could also decide to share the same factory job. Only a small percentage of the working population would

of them do not seem to think much of the idea.

Earlier retirement, as envisaged by the Labour Ministry, would be modelled on a similar approach in the food and catering industry by the head of the catering workers' union, Günter Döding.

The Döding Plan, whereby the low social security pensions of older workers who retire prematurely are supplemented by the employers, has the advantage of being reversible. To make up for this added financial burden on the employers, the younger workers have agreed to moderate their wage demands — in theory anyway.

This would provide a certain amount of relief on the job market, but the benefits would be relatively small for three reasons:

First, there is every likelihood that wage-related operating costs would rise. This is due to the fact that the remaining work force is unlikely to agree to wage cutbacks, as proposed by the Catholic sociologist Oswald von Nell-Braunung who said that it should be taken for granted that if working hours are shortened wages would also have to be pared down.

Second, not every post that has been vacated as a result of early retirement can be filled by a younger person.

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seriously consider part-time work and job sharing. Yet even these few per cent could provide some relief on the job market.

As important as shorter working times in the current political discussion are programmes aimed at providing the unemployed with better skills and measures that would improve the placement of "difficult cases".

Conservatives reject the present job creating policies, arguing that they achieve the opposite of the desired effect: worse instead of better growth conditions and less rather than more flexibility at work.

They — like Rüdiger Soltwedel of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy — call for "fewer job creating policies".

Soltwedel's appeal is based on the ex-

Continued on page 7

The jobless hold their first national conference

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Germany's first congress of the nation's unemployed has been held in Frankfurt. The 1,500 delegates from all parts of the country did not issue a communique. They decided instead to publish a report later.

Even though the delegates from 256 unions, church and other action groups for the unemployed were unable to agree on a national organisation, they decided to appeal to the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) to accept the unemployed as members of individual unions. It was also decided to hold a major demonstration in Bonn next year.

The decision not to form a special unemployed union was as a surprise to observers — especially since the first two days of the congress seemed to indicate that a motion by a Berlin group to form such a union would be adopted.

After hours of discussion the 500 participants in one work group agreed, however, that it would be more effective to call on the DGB to accept unemployed people as members and permit them to take part in its decision-making processes.



So far, only teachers', sales staff, banking and insurance unions have been known to accept the unemployed as members. The DGB sent observers to Frankfurt.

What matters is that the action groups of the unemployed have been strengthened in their field work and that there will be a much closer cooperation between the various initiatives in terms of welfare for fellow-jobless and future action.

He stressed that the jobless initiatives did not want to dissolve themselves within the trade unions but that they only wanted to cooperate with them.

Said Pharo: "The learning process in the DGB has already begun. The unions will step up their discussion of the unemployment problem."

Albert Bechtold
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 6 December 1982)



The Big Five hold secret meeting to try and stave off major breakdown

The finance ministers and central bank presidents of the five most important industrial nations (USA, Britain, France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany) met in Kronberg near Frankfurt this month.

They did not face the press and no communiqué was issued. Why did they hold such a mysterious meeting?

Because several developing and East Bloc countries are no longer able to service their foreign debt on schedule. Their insolvency is not only a financial problem; it could also damage world trade.

A country that is unable to raise a loan cannot import. And since Mexico became a problem virtually overnight, when it found itself unable to repay interest and principal on its foreign debt, the unthinkable has become thinkable: a chain reaction that could lead to a major breakdown.

Politicians have long seen themselves on the edge of an abyss. At the Versailles Summit in June 1982, the governments of the seven major industrial nations tried to find a cure.

But because of many previous unfulfilled promises few people believed that they actually intended to deliver.

At that time, the main industrial nations said that they would strengthen the position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The five nations whose currencies make up the basket on which the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) — a kind of artificial international currency — are based, are the same that met in Kronberg. The intention was to help the IMF control the economic policies of its member nations, thus making for a bit of collective responsibility in the world's economy.

But what use is it if the five big ones cooperate while the IMF is short of money? Therefore, the Kronberg meeting also dealt with ways and means of speeding up the IMF's supply of funds beyond the usual procedure.

Developments in the Third World are creating two oil price explosions: one a dangerous international mixture of recession, declining commodity prices, high interest rates and too ambitious development programmes that were put off keeping with long-term financing possibilities.

But commercial banks — acting like lemmings — kept financing these programmes, thus helping to build up mountains of debt. As Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl put it: "At times, the banks were more concerned with expansion than with security and profitability."

Governments, banks, the World Bank and the IMF were brought up short at the last annual meeting of the IMF in Toronto when it turned out that Mexico was far from being the only insolvent country.

Even then, policy makers have been pondering ways and means of preventing the collapse of the world financial system. The key phrase they came up with was "cooperation" by all parties concerned, with the IMF playing a pivotal role.

As an initial measure, the Mexican government was granted bridging facilities



ties by American government authorities and a number of central banks via the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.

Short-term credits helped Mexico weather the rough patch before concluding a stabilisation agreement with the IMF.

The banks agreed to freeze their claims for the moment and the IMF has meanwhile agreed to grant an emergency credit of close to \$4bn. Brazil applied for \$5bn; and Argentina is in the process of negotiating \$2bn.

Through the Bank for International Settlements, Hungary was granted a bridging loan until the conclusion of negotiations for an IMF credit.

Many of the nations now writing under their foreign debt will soon be queuing up at the IMF credit desk.

The IMF is anxious to help them restore their creditworthiness. But is it equipped to?

The idea behind the IMF is to make life easier for its members. It helps out with short and medium-term loans, repayable after seven years at the latest. The loans depend on current account imbalances that cannot be settled in the short term. The IMF itself receives the funds through its member nations. These contributions in turn depend on the volume of trade, the GNP and similar data.

Member nations can borrow up to one-quarter of their own quota with no strings attached.

As a result, most of the debtors owe it no more than 25 per cent of their own quota.

The more a country goes beyond this 25 per cent, using credit facilities of up to 100 per cent of its quota, the tougher the terms imposed on the borrowing nation.

IMF's ability to impose conditions that will force its debtors to introduce remedial action for previous economic policy mistakes is the basis on which the hope to prevent a collapse of the world's financial system despite mounting debts now rests.



Donald Regan, the American Treasury Secretary (left), with Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the Kronberg finance meeting. (Photo: dpa)

All IMF member nations agree that the Fund's own means of \$67bn are inadequate. But they are far from agreed on the amount by which this liquidity is to be boosted.

Most European Community countries would like to raise the quotas by 50 per cent to total about \$90bn to \$100bn.

The developing countries would like to have this increased to \$120bn. They would also like to see the IMF do away with all strings it now attaches to loans, turning it into a self-service institution.

The USA has so far not been prepared to boost the quotas by more than 40 per cent. Bonn — as usual at international meetings — is proceeding gingerly. It is said that Bonn would like to see the total raised to \$100bn but that it would also go along with \$85bn, wedged as it is between the USA and the EEC.

Generally, the goal is to make America agree to a 50 per cent increase.

The quotas themselves say little about the IMF's actual ability to effectively help countries that suffer from persistent foreign trade and current account imbalances.

Not all currencies are equally suitable for credits. The Indian rupee, for instance, is far less suitable than the US dollar, the Deutschmark, the yen and the Swiss franc.

Despite seven quota increases (the eighth was negotiated in Kronberg to the point where it is likely to be finalised by next April) and despite credit agreements with Saudi Arabia and some industrial countries, the Fund's available means are limited — especially compared with demand.

In the first quarter of 1982, the IMF had \$36bn available to it in suitable currencies. This was made up of the contributions of seven industrial, eight oil-exporting and 15 developing countries. In addition, there was the \$21bn available to the IMF in the form of SDRs (which only central banks accept).

As a result it had available to it some \$57bn in suitable currencies.

Of this amount, \$16bn is out on loan, \$15bn has been committed in the form of credits that have not yet been taken up.

The International Monetary Fund

1 The fund has 146 member industrial countries and 126 developing nations, of whom 12 are exporters.

2 Credits are financed by member payments. It has a total of \$67bn either available or committed. Available funds have been boosted in the past few years by special facilities financed by direct credits granted by national monetary authorities. In addition, there are the special credit agreements with 10 of the most important industrial nations and Switzerland. Under the terms of these agreements, the fund can grant credits of up to \$7bn. It also resorts to money markets.

3 The fund's top executive body is the board of governors. The main decision-making body is the board of directors, which is made up of representatives of the member nations.

making for \$31bn in committed funds one way or another.

The remaining \$26bn would be up very soon if only some of the countries with major foreign debts applied for IMF loans.

The IMF liquidity would also be sufficient if only a few of the more than 70 developing countries that now apply for IMF loans wanted to increase their quotas.

Whether or not the IMF will be able to play a greater role in the financing of the world's economies depends on two things: the willingness of member nations to provide more funds; and the willingness of member nations to accept unpopular measures regarding their economic policies.

The first of these will be hard to implement because quota increases must be ratified by the individual member nations, and this can take years.

So far, only Bonn has taken a firm attitude towards America's proposal to create a special emergency fund that would be re-financed as needed by the ten most important industrial nations plus Switzerland to the tune of \$10bn to \$15bn.

Among the topics of discussion at Kronberg was also the question whether the 'special' fund should be made part of the general credit facilities of the ten industrial nations and Switzerland that provide the fund with credits of up to \$7bn under special conditions.

This would mean that the IMF would have another \$17bn to \$22bn available to it. Credits given under the general conditions may, however, only be granted to the participating 11 countries while those from the 'special' fund would be made available to developing countries outside that group.

The second prerequisite for strengthening of the IMF's role is easier access. After all, once they find themselves in dire straits, governments are more likely to accept the IMF's conditions for loans.

This was not so in the past. In 1981, it lent a net \$55bn to non-producing developing countries, compared with commercial bank loans of \$85bn during the same period.

In the past, the IMF and commercial banks have been competing for the same borrowers.

Dying steel city looks for a future to forge

Neunkirchen, whose steel production had for years been helping to depress the nearby Neunkirchen works, stepped in and bought the plants at both Neunkirchen and at Röschling-Burbach.

But the world-wide crisis meant that there was no relief. Japan was dumping cheap steel and all the traditional steel-producing nations were paying the price.

The steel magnates of the Saar have been taking their time looking for a way to solve the problem. They began looking in 1977 but have found no solution.

The Saar has been living with uncertainty for five years but there have been nothing more than a few orderly demonstrations and protest rallies.

The main reason for the placid response is that 55-year-olds are able to retire on good pensions. Others hope that subsidies from Bonn will save their jobs.

Still others have been pinning their hopes on working elsewhere: if they could work 30km away at another steel-works at Völklingen, it would mean more travel, but not unemployment.

Some have got jobs there already, but they are still gloomy about the future because it is a more obsolete plant than Neunkirchen's, and is being kept going

only through heavy doses of government money.

Bonn has been pumping millions into the Saar, and the state government knows that it would forfeit its reason for existence if the Arbed-Saar steel-works folded.

Bonn and the Saarland government have already risked and done a great deal, but the Saar man-in-the-street believes that many of the millions pumped in will benefit the Luxembourg steel industry more than the Saar's.

In the mid-1950s when the Saar became German again there were many people who wanted it to become a sort of model state for Europe. They did not want to be German but independent. This was rejected by the majority of voters.

History is full of ironies. The decline of the Saar steel industry has now made the state economically largely dependent on a foreign country after all — Luxembourg.

The next few weeks and months will show the extent of this dependence and whether, as rumour has it, the steel crisis will lead to a disintegration of the Saar.

So what is to be done? Bonn Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber has been unable so far to commit himself to

also create certain public sector jobs that an unemployed person would have to accept when offered it.


It is obvious that making it compulsory for the jobless to train or retrain and to accept public sector work would reduce the abuse of public funds.

Making it more difficult to abuse benefits and paring down some of these benefits could ease the financial position of the Labour Office. But it would not really remedy our unemployment woes.

It is up to the government's economic and fiscal policy and to the parties to collective bargaining (who still do not understand the link between unemployment and wages) to create new jobs.

For the time being, job creating policies are growing ever more expensive — and this won't change after the 6 March national elections.

Dieter Piel
(Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)



shifting Germany's only coal liquefaction plant to Neunkirchen.

The people of Neunkirchen would be happy to accept even such a risky project. But they are also prepared to accept social change and permit the city to become an efficient centre of service industries.

The city council is now looking for new industries. Right now, all that the 51,000 people of Neunkirchen (and the 200,000 others in the vicinity) know is that they want to survive. So does the Saar as a whole.

If the Arbed steel works fold, some 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the steel industry and related industries would be lost.

Says one politician: "If that happens, we can auction off the Saar to the highest bidder."

Gerd Meiser
(Kleiner Nachrichten, 8 December 1982)

Continued from page 5

experience gained in countries that spent a lot of money on such policies, achieving very little (Sweden); and in countries that spent relatively little but imposed heavy restrictions on individuals, forcing them to adapt to worsening economic conditions, managing to keep the jobless rate down (Austria).

The opposing camp, represented among others by the Federal Labour Office, demands that more money be spent. These people fear that there will be a loss of flexibility on the labour market because of declining funds for further training, retraining and other specialised programmes for certain groups of jobless.

There is a kernel of truth in both arguments. Many job creating measures are an open invitation to abuse them and go over board in laying claim to public funds.

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THE ENVIRONMENT

Coordinating body tries to resolve differences of protest groups

The BBU, or national coordinating body of environmental protest groups, was launched 10 years ago.

It celebrated the anniversary in such a level-headed, businesslike manner that it seemed happy its teething troubles were over.

The general assembly was held in a canary-yellow comprehensive school in Hanover, a factory-like building that did not lend itself to demonstrations of pride in what had been achieved.

A degree of satisfaction was the most that could be said to have been voiced by the 100 or so delegates.

They were satisfied that the organisation had succeeded in keeping together and emerging as a factor in environmental policy that parliaments and the authorities could no longer ignore.

The BBU office has moved from Karlsruhe to Bonn (and the organisation does not amount to much more than an office). The move testifies to self-confidence.

It is a self-confidence BBU officials have long felt but one that is not shared by many protest groups affiliated to it.

They still sense the contradiction between a spontaneous, local and one-off protest group and a central organisation, no matter how loosely organised it might be.

They are worried that people at the



top might lose contact with the grass roots, the rank and file.

But after 10 years of work there is a growing realisation that both local activities and countrywide campaigns are needed.

As one delegate put it, it was high time the organisation abandoned short trousers and donned its first suit and the change brooked no further delay.

The BBU was keen to establish a wide-ranging alliance of all extra-parliamentary forces. It had long abandoned the narrowly-based platform of an anti-nuclear power movement.

In its progress toward what Jo Leinen, spokesman for the executive committee, called an ecological and alternative movement the BBU increasingly reflected the public debate.

The debate on the future of industrial society had only just begun in earnest.

All constituent groups will not choose to follow the BBU in this direction, but there have always been groups that resigned membership and others that took their place.

The BBU has never led from above; it has never been more than a letter-box

or central information service for individual groups, and the groups have taken care to ensure that was how it remained.

That is why there is little point in wondering how many members the BBU unites. It has access to about 1,050 groups with a combined membership of roughly 300,000, but it cannot mobilise them.

What individual groups do is entirely for them to decide, and they are keen to retain their independence.

By no means all environmental groups are affiliated to the BBU. More are affiliated to it in the south, less in the north of the country.

The protest groups are legitimate political offspring of the Social and Free Democratic coalition in keeping with Willy Brandt's promise to "risk more democracy."

But they have chosen to aim at a somewhat different, more grass-root democratic interpretation by which greater importance is attached to group independence than to the weight carried by a large organisation.

Where a specific objective is at stake, such as an autobahn, a chemicals factory or a kindergarten that is needed, this independent status makes sense.

But major, supranational issues, from atmospheric pollution to waste of ground water, call for organised activity at state or national level.

This need runs counter to the origins of the protest group movement, which began as a spontaneous reaction by individuals personally affected.

The anniversary conference dealt, against this background, with three issues: topics, the crisis in connection with forms of activity and the question: "What has been accomplished?"

There can be no doubt that classical environmental issues will continue to be dealt with, but they alone are no longer enough.

Experts needed

"Acid rainfall is an environmental hazard that actually exists, but what about genetic engineering, the potential hazards of which can but be imagined (albeit without much difficulty)?"

The protest movement can no longer manage without expert opinion and specialists; and the gap between those who are conversant with the facts and those who carry out the groups' activities grows ever wider.

Has the demonstration as the major form of activity outlived its usefulness? A majority felt it had not, but was aware of the problems that arose from the participation of "autonomous groups."

These are groups that are prepared to use violence, whereas the BBU strictly insists on non-violence. When and where is the line to be drawn?

Do new forms of non-violent action exist that might have a wider public appeal?

About 1,800 demonstrators against the new runway at Frankfurt airport look like facing criminal proceedings that could easily lead to suit for damages or payment of the cost of sending in the police.

Ought the BBU to keep its view of itself on this risk of the right to demonstrate being undermined by government cash demands? Or should it see this as a civil rights movement?

"In 10 years we have made progress," said Inge Ammon, who was elected to the executive committee.

"But in future," she added, "we must not just accuse; we must outline specific solutions."

True enough, environmental protest has been heightened. So, too, has the uneasy conscience of ecological offenders.

But the BBU has failed to achieve a breakthrough to a generally accepted ecological viewpoint.

It has no desire to have dealings with the political parties, preferring to steer clear of them. This even applies to the Greens, although a benevolent view of them is taken.

Many Greens come from the ranks of protest groups and even from the BBU itself, but the BBU would prefer to remain identified with the Greens.

The Greens, after all, are felt to have accomplished everything they were the characteristic features of the BBU members are those who say they feel themselves to be a part of the Greens.

This they owe to their status as a violent, non-partisan, extra-parliamentary movement.

This definition betrays uneasiness and the change of power in Bonn is only a minor part.

Nearly everyone in the movement says a colder wind is now blowing. Some are firmly convinced the Greens are an outsider, in Paris from 1914. He appreciated his disorientation to impose legal restraints on the BBU.

In point of fact, however, the protest groups are suffering from the consequences of their own success.

The BBU has grown so large and so influential, indeed popular, that it is no longer a small group of enthusiasts but a force to be reckoned with.

It feels duty bound to be even more successful and not to disappoint its members.

But no-one yet knows how to do this without becoming a lobby or a political auxiliary and without losing the character of the movement.

The BBU is so at a loss as to what to do from here that it no longer is proud of what it has accomplished.

Several million ordinary people engaged in practical politics as members of protest groups.

Many preferred as a result not to be involved in politics but to remain as established political parties but more, especially young people, are looking for an alternative to resignation and indifference.

In criticising shortcomings of the movement they have stabilised the system point they are not so happy to hear.

But their influence on the parties remained disappointingly slight.

Is why some BBU members are keen on the idea of functioning as a Bonn environmental lobby.

All this is to be discussed next year at a strategy conference. The BBU has long progressed from environmental conservation to ecology and politics.

It deals with missile modernisation, the peace movement, upholding the fundamental rights, solidarity with the victims of Bonn spending.

be they students or tenants, and structures in the economy and social life.

Outsiders are less in doubt about the success of the BBU in terms with the change.

Horst Blum (Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)

THE ARTS

De Chirico: a longing for unknown horizons

But it is a half-hearted attempt that carries little conceptual conviction, and for some inexplicable reason 1935 is taken as a turning point.

The full rooms hung with his metaphysical paintings are followed by an eclectic and scaled-down appendix that can hardly be said to succeed in even posing the crucial question.

Historically, the crucial question is that of the relationship between continuity and de Chirico's break with his past.

The Nietzsche quotations listed in the catalogue and the abundance of facts and individually illuminating iconographical analyses are not much help either.

They run a risk of making de Chirico's paintings appear nothing but riddles, unless, that is, one is prepared to accept an interpretation that is a hopeless mess even in historical terms.

In this connection light is shed solely by Christian Derouet's brilliant and well-founded work on de Chirico's neo-baroque gladiator series.

This is even though it evidently runs counter to other writers by implicitly confirming Rubin's view, and Rubin's spirited plea for prime importance to be attached to de Chirico's early work is determinedly and convincingly seen in the context of modernity.

Yet the gruesome series of portraits at the Munich exhibition shows that de Chirico, while styling himself with increasing insistence and virtuoso painting a tragic seer and thinker and a monumental figure, retained a vivid capacity at least as a painter of pathetic gestures.

His love of riddles, here conjured in inscriptions, all too often ends in empty rhetoric. Where de Chirico earlier allowed what Breton called the *objet-fantôme* to speak, the riddle remains solely in capital letters. In his metaphysical painting the ambivalence of petrification and life, expressing a conflict situation specific to the era, shows how the painter's ego has grown alien to him, along with the world. It features wide and empty squares lined by arcades in deep shadow and by walls that time and again hide what is behind them from view. On them monuments and tiny schematic humans, toy-like train shapes and clocks convey the effect of hermetic ciphers from an inner world projected outwardly. Like his tailor's dummies, manikins and, as it were, physiognomically throttled masks, they are images of a

mainly objectified world. The emotional overvaluation of distorted objects that appear condensed and split up at one and the same time, as in a dream, is the result of a melancholy view. De Chirico, in his own words, was possessed by a longing for unknown horizons.

The melancholy disposition has long included a love of geometry, and this love is ever-present in de Chirico's paintings.

It is literally embodied in his metaphysical interiors with their unstably interspersed angles.

What with irritatingly interspersed stalks of sugar candy, plaited confectionery and geographical maps, they convert the studio picture of old into a mysterious still life.

Where pictures of disused factories are included, quotation-like, the anachronistic role of art in an industrial society is also described.

Where the gods are dead, art becomes the refuge of metaphysics.

De Chirico's imagination is fired by the seemingly emblematic symbols of advertising, unexpectedly railed alongside antique busts of Apollo to mark a break between the ancient world and the present.

As objects stand still, historic discontinuity seems to part company with time altogether.

De Chirico's longing is for the lost world of ancient art and mythology. It keeps alive a painful recollection of childhood.

One is reminded of Freud's psychoanalytical interpretations of ancient myths and Aby Warburg's interpretation of antiquity.

The broken topicalisation of antiquity, reminiscent of Arnold Böcklin and Max Klinger, stands in tension with the everyday world of objects.

At the time, de Chirico withstood the tension, forestalling a backward-looking romantic empathy with the past.

De Chirico ends by drawing a conclusion from a conflict that came to a head in the 19th century, being strikingly put by Karl Marx, who asked:

"But where the Cubists aimed at a reflection on modes of portrayal and sought to demonstrate the difference between fact and fiction of painting, what de Chirico aims at is a mode of expression."

The staggering irrationality of his rooms, vanishing into the background and then suddenly turning, serves to make matters mysterious and seem bereft of location and gravity.

De Chirico's pictorial world lacks stability. Scenes are broken and shadows live lives of their own, like Peter Schlemmer's in 'Charnisso's Romantic novella.'

Even colours are seen in identical contrast near and far, starkly contrasting directions of movement block each other as in a trauma.

De Chirico turns into a motif of paralysis, what the futurists were to see as the quintessence of a new aesthetics, the celebration of speed and technology.

His locomotives and ships may gather steam but they are also rigidly immobile. In this perspectification of anxiety, de Chirico reflects the shadow of the First World War.

Monika Stelthausen (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 December 1982)

De Chirico's catalogue is available from Prietel Verlag, Munich.

De Chirico's 'Le muse inquietante', 1917.

De Chirico: self portrait, 1919. (Photos: Catalogue)

"Where is Vulcan in comparison with Robert & Co., Jupiter in comparison with the lightning conductor and Hermes in comparison with the Crédit mobilier?"

"Is Achilles possible alongside powder and lead? Would the Iliad be conceivable alongside the printing press and printing machinery?"

"Do singing, sagas and the muse not necessarily end with the age of print, with the end of essential prerequisites of epic poetry?"

From this anachronistic relationship noted by Marx, de Chirico develops his new poetry, although he would have been unlikely to arrive at a style of his own had it not been for his encounter with the Paris avant-garde.

His Chinese puzzle with perspective recreating the spatial illusion of the Renaissance, only to dash it by abruptly combining several vanishing points, would have been inconceivable without the schooling provided by Cubism.

So, as Soby and Rubin have shown, would his decision to dispense with uniform lighting and corresponding body modelling.

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
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SOCIETY

Persistent alcoholism given as reason for not legalising soft drugs

Drugs such as cannabis and LSD are not quite as popular as they were in the 1970s, a Munich conference has been told.

But socially acceptable additions, such as alcohol caused as many problems as ever. There was, therefore, no case for easing restrictions on soft drugs.

Christiane F., now a budding pop singer, is no longer the 15-year-old cover girl most Germans associated with heroin addiction a few years ago.

Her tale, that of a West Berlin addict in her early teens who, unlike many of her friends, kicked the habit, was serialised in *Stern* magazine.

It sold well as a book and the film version of *Wir Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo* (We Children of Zoo Station) was also seen by many.

Christiane F.'s name was a household word that has now almost been forgotten. It is just as well: it will never be known how many young people her tale must have encouraged to follow in her junkie footsteps.

It would be best if magazines which claim to feature such stories for educational purposes were to steer clear of, say, the glue-sniffers of Berlin or Cologne.

They would again be to blame for popularising drug addiction to epidemic proportions.

Drugs are an unsolved problem that cannot simply be reduced to spectacular instances of institutional failure such as lay behind the dead Frankfurt fixer whose tale was recently told on an TV current affairs programme.

The problem cannot be limited to drugs generally accepted as narcotics in society today, to hallucinogens such as LSD, cannabis, cocaine and the opiates. Branding them as illegal merely made it easier to take others less seriously, lawyer Arthur Kreuzer told the 34th annual conference of the German Social Paediatric Association in Munich.

Alcohol was one such alternative that needed to be taken seriously, both because its use was so widespread and because of the effect it had on individuals and society.

Criminal activity in connection with alcohol was, he estimated, more widespread than crime in connection with narcotics.

Educationally the distinction in law between cannabis and alcohol made no sense, but that was not to be taken as a plea for easing restrictions on "soft" drugs.

"We already have a whole range of difficulties with alcohol to deal with," said pharmacologist Wolfgang Forth. There was no need of yet another narcotic to be socially integrated.

Instead of debating whether cannabis ought to be made more freely available we ought to be wondering whether we have nothing better to offer young people than the freedom to indulge in unreal dreams in a state of intoxication. The drug scene has eased off a little, international statistics show. This impression was borne out by a number of papers at the Munich interdisciplinary conference.

Hashish consumption has declined in comparison with the 1970s in Germany, which cannot be said of heroin or co-



Cocaine, the fashionable drug preferred by the creative upper class.

A trend has been apparent for the past three years in the United States too. There has been a slight decline in hashish and opiate consumption.

Heroin consumption has likewise declined slightly lately in the US. There also has been a substantial drop in the market for LSD and angel's dust.

And there is a change in the reasons given for drug consumption. US youngsters used to share a joint to get high; now they claim to take drugs to boost performance.

There is a corresponding increase in the taking of tablets and pills, a habit particularly widespread among women.

The trend is borne out by 1973, 1976 and 1980 polls of Bavarian youngsters aged 12 to 24.

The Bavarian polls take into account the No. 1 drug, alcohol. An estimated 8.7 per cent of Bavarian youngsters are potential or actual alcoholics.

In the 1980 poll 11 per cent of the young people questioned said they had taken drugs; in the previous poll their number was 12 per cent.

In all three polls two out of three takers merely tried narcotics out. In this category, numbers have declined, whereas regular users have remained steady at between four and five per cent.

There has been a steady decline in both categories among 12- to 17-year-olds. Among 17- to 24-year-olds the number of consumers in either category has stayed at a steady 18 per cent.

Young people are definitely older than they used to be when they smoke their first joint. In 1980 they were 17 on average; in 1976 they were 15.

Among regular users the trend is even more marked. In 1976 46 per cent of addicts were 18-20 years old and 27 per cent 21-24.

In 1980 41 per cent were 21-24 years old and 33 per cent 18-20.

The drug most frequently taken is hashish, which in the Bavarian polls is listed alongside LSD, mescaline and other hallucinogens.

Its popularity increased from two thirds in 1973 to nearly three quarters in 1980, compared with a decline in the use of other drugs.

More Germans are tending to drink less or not at all, according to a government survey: nine per cent of men and 29 per cent of women, compared with seven per cent and 20 per cent in a similar survey in 1973.

But the same proportion of the population drink alcohol every day or almost every day (55 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women) as in 1973 and 1978.

A curious finding: the highest proportion of regular drinkers is in villages of fewer than 2,000 people. Yet the addiction rate is highest in cities and reduces with the size of the community.

consumption frequency of other narcotics. The figures for these were five per cent for opiates, mainly heroin, in 1980, 11 per cent for stimulants, four per cent for sniffing and an unspecified but definite decline in consumption of LSD and mescaline.

Cocaine abuse is on the increase, from two per cent in 1973 to four per cent in 1980, while in terms of drug consumers as a whole the comparison is even more striking.

Cocaine was taken by seven per cent of youngsters who had tried out narcotics in 1980 and by 13 per cent of regular users, the figures for 1973 being three and seven per cent.

Hashish undeniably continues to be the drug most people first try, although only five per cent of people who have ever given it a try end up as heroin addicts.

Yet most of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 heroin addicts in the Federal Republic of Germany began their narcotics careers with hashish, said Cologne sociologist Karl-Heinz Reuband.

So there is not an automatic progression from the joint to the fix, especially as cannabis is not habit-forming in the sense of creating a physical addiction.

That is more than can be said for barbiturates, painkillers, heroin and alcohol, and even among heroin addicts there are cases or people voluntarily kicking the habit, as Arthur Kreuzer pointed out.

He felt pacemaker theories of all kinds were naive. By no means all juvenile shoplifters went on to become fully-fledged criminals.

Many young people who give drugs a try give them up because they get nothing from them. Such expectations and disappointments were as much part of a drug career as social background, Herr Reuband said.

Progress or access to drugs could only be understood in the context of young people's social contacts.

Those who were sociable and had friends stood a greater chance of coming into contact with drugs. But it would be wrong simply to refer to young people being led astray.

Progress was determined by curiosity typical of the young; by the desire to gain personal experience even though the risk (of, say, heroin) was well known.

They also were impressed by and large by the drug scene, felt emotional

More people are leaving the bottle alone, says report

The survey was issued by Irmgard Karwatzki, state secretary to the Bonn Youth, Family Affairs and Health Ministry in reply to a parliamentary question by Christian Democrat Werner Dörmann.

Since 1978, however, the number of potential alcoholics has declined. New 14 per cent of men and five per cent of women are felt to be potential alcoholics.

The highest proportion of regular drinkers is in villages of fewer than 2,000 people. Yet the addiction rate is highest in cities and reduces with the size of the community.

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ties with what was a peer group were introduced to narcotics by friends. This was the usual way in which access to drugs was gained; it deterred the further progress of young people toward addiction.

Drug taking is behaviour that must be learnt. To this day it remains, as hygiene expert M. Franks put it, an expression of social protest.

It might, Herr Kreuzer said, be a sign of psychosocial deviation, but was not problems, subjectively, that paved the way into the drug world, Herr Reuband added.

What made it so attractive was the experience of the scene. At the trial of the affair has come out, Herr Kreuzer put it: "The dealer is felt to be a friend, not a murderer."

Young people may be less inclined to attribute drug taking to personal problems, but these problems object to drugs.

Drugs were taken, H. Solms said, to give satisfaction but to avoid dissatisfaction.

Outlining a psychoanalytical approach to the trial of a man tempted at self-treatment, albeit one doomed to failure, on the part of the immature personality.

The clash between a weak ego with the libido, and a tyrannical superego was externalised and transferred to certain aspects of society that were tacked as being authoritarian.

This was inwardly depleted, and demands of the superego were projected on to the "others," thereby giving rise to a typical sleeper has two duties:

The addict fought on two fronts: against himself and against the outside world. He constantly wavered between rebellion and clinging on to others.

Therapeutic treatment of addicts must bear this in mind. An addict is not a person who can be treated by the church will seek via drugs the escape from his own limitations. He is not himself for fear of being overwhelmed by his own emotions.

Treatment must attempt to make the addict as soon as the going became a bit positive experience, of the drug, he told the Russians. He had got superfluous by virtue of positive information from friends employed in the therapy group.

It must entail progress toward normality for young people with psychological problems resulting from a disturbed childhood interface.

Parents must thus in evitably be involved in the therapy, and this was stressed by more than one speaker at the conference.

But nothing was said by parents of drug addicts, and no reports were given by therapists on practical experience with the group work.

Therapeutic treatment of addicts no longer felt as it was a few years ago, said the speaker.

Psychologist Elisabeth Franke said that 19 of 30 young addicts who had fallen foul of the law and been sent to a closed hospital in Bonn had now broken with the habit.

D. Ladewig outlined findings of an aftercare in Basle, Switzerland. Half the addicts reviewed had broken off their addiction, but 80 per cent of those who lasted the distance, 18 months in a therapeutic community, either kicked the habit or managed to run their lives.


It was, he said, a four-stage process consisting of decontamination, breaking the habit, rehabilitation and aftercare. The crucial feature was to give addicts a sense of self-assurance. Genuine sense must be shown in the individual.

The emphasis by doctors, psychologists, educationalists and parents must be on help, not penalisation.

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STATE SECURITY

Tank armour secret to all but Moscow



Secret weakness of the Leopard II tank was no secret to the Russians before it began coming off the assembly lines in 1979.

The tank's armour was faulty because makers had decided against it through a special strengthening process.

The Leopard II armour was said to be less effective than that of the Russians.

The story of the affair has come out with spying for the Soviet agent, Dietrich Manfred Liebert, 47.

Liebert is said to have worked for the Soviet from 1967, but for much of the time was what is known in the espionage world as a sleeper.

Liebert is a highly trained spy who was inactive until he is needed. He took occasional training courses, but is not to be on any counter-intelligence courses.

Typical sleeper has two duties: to keep the East Bloc once a year against himself and against the outside world. He constantly wavered between rebellion and clinging on to others.

Therapeutic treatment of addicts must bear this in mind. An addict is not a person who can be treated by the church will seek via drugs the escape from his own limitations. He is not himself for fear of being overwhelmed by his own emotions.

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penalties for late delivery, so they agreed among themselves to skip the "glow process" in which the plating is heated to 800 deg. C and exposed to it for 60 hours. This adds tensile strength. Believing that "the Bundeswehr is too stupid to notice anything," they sandblasted the plating as it was and released it for assembly.

The incident became known and a lot of people were fired, said Liebert, who then was a metalworker.

The Russians then told him to study mechanical engineering. Liebert, then 31, did exactly that, on a German government student allowance. He graduated, having specialised in material testing.

Everything worked like a charm, and when he needed steel samples — allegedly in connection with his studies — his card-playing friends were happy to oblige with discarded bits of the latest batch of armour plating.

He buried the samples in pre-arranged places where they were picked up by Soviet couriers and rushed to Moscow.

The head of personnel at one of the Thyssen companies, testifying as a witness, explained to the court how Liebert was able to obtain the samples: one of

welding seams tended to come loose as the going became a bit positive experience, of the drug, he told the Russians. He had got superfluous by virtue of positive information from friends employed in the therapy group.

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
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Defrocked: the Leopard II tank.

(Photo: Wenz)

his friends was a material and welding seam tester who marked pieces that passed the quality test with a chalk mark. He was able to pass scrap samples on to Liebert.

The friendship between the two continued after Liebert graduated with a diploma as a mechanical engineer.

Now he could no longer say that he needed the samples for his studies; so he said he was working for an engineering firm that was developing steel for tank armour and was hoping to arrange a big deal.

He asked his friends to help out with steel samples — especially the new HZB 20 and HZB 301 types. This is the steel used for the Leopard II's turrets and fronts, the most vulnerable parts of a tank. His friends were again happy to oblige.

In retrospect, it seems doubtful whether the Soviet spymasters were well advised to activate their sleeper.

Hasso Ziegler

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 27 November 1982)

Beware of East Berlin agents, industrialists warned

Industrialists in the Federal Republic have been warned to be on their guard against industrial spies from East Germany.

The Chief Federal Prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, told a meeting in Bad Dürkheim that about 20 per cent of East Germany's espionage in the Federal Republic involved commerce.

He said that sometimes GDR industrial buyers demanded detailed information about production methods. This was a common East German ploy.

Rebmann said that there are between 1,500 and 2,500 GDR agents in the Federal Republic. About 50 are caught each year by counter-intelligence.

Their tasks vary. Some collect political and economic information — as in the case of former Chancellor Willy Brandt's personal assistant Günter Guillaume who provided the GDR leadership with top secret inside information.

Others collect industrial secrets, and save the GDR an estimated DM300m a year in research costs.

The recruiting approach for West Germans to spy for the GDR is always the same: they are either accepted during visits to East Germany or are recruited through advertisements of seemingly innocuous companies.

Secretaries, who are usually rather productive sources of information, are approached by male recruiters pretending to be in love with them.



Kurt Rebmann... watch the secretaries' boyfriend.

(Photo: dpa)

Despite the GDR's massive spying activities in the Federal Republic, Chief Federal Prosecutor Rebmann's main concern is still terrorism.

Though the danger from terrorism has lessened since 1977, he told the industrialists that it would remain a danger as long as certain groupings re-

sorted to violence in pursuit of their political goals.

Independent terrorist groupings were increasingly prepared to undermine the authority of the judiciary and executive branch and thus also undermine democracy.

Rebmann, whose predecessor was killed by terrorists in 1977, said that we must learn from the 1920s and 1930s and check any development that could lead to violence and anarchy.

He appealed to Western countries to cooperate in the search for German terrorists. He regretted the lack of cooperation from some Middle East countries where terrorists are provided with a haven and training.

Germany must still expect terrorist attacks on people who are considered to symbolise society. The revolutionary cells were growing increasingly dangerous and the Red Army Faction (RAF) still enjoyed support.



Günther Lecher

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 2 December 1982)

Handwritten text: 1982.12.19

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